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During the past decade, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans have fled to 
neighbouring countries to evade the state-prescribed forced labour of the 
indefinite national service. Now the EU is attempting to keep these people 
away from Europe by providing significant funding to the Eritrean and Su-
danese regimes. The plans developed to date are not working towards an 
improvement in the living conditions of those affected, but rather towards 
increased repression.
 • Since the implementation of the indefinite national service in 2002, hundreds 
of thousands of working-age Eritreans have been performing military and civil 
services for the state, for minimal pay. This system of organised forced labour 
has led to massive human flight and the development of organised human 
smuggling.
 • Since 2014, tens of thousands of Eritreans have managed to reach Europe via 
Libya. The majority of those who have fled, however, live in neighbouring Ethio-
pia and Sudan, often in precarious conditions. They live in fear of falling prey to 
human-trafficking gangs or being deported back to their home country, where 
they face imprisonment without trial because their flight is viewed as treason.
 • Through the Khartoum Process, the EU is attempting to stem the flow of refu-
gees to Europe. As part of this process, the Sudanese military and police forces 
are to be given support to capture and intern refugees.
 • At the same time, the EU has resumed development cooperation with Eritrea 
and has pledged EUR 200 million for the expansion of the energy sector and to 
support improved governance. This assistance is not tied to conditions.
Policy Implications
The courting of autocratic regimes is not an effective strategy for combating the 
causes of refugee flight. Instead, development assistance should be tied to condi-
tions and should require and support comprehensive reforms. These include, first 
and foremost, the shortening of the national service, which is the main cause of 
flight; the liberalisation of the Eritrean command economy; and the develop-
ment of rule-of-law structures.
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Indefinite National Service, Forced Labour, and a Mass Exodus
Shortly after Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, the Eritrean govern-
ment, which had emerged from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, implement-
ed an 18-month military and national service. It was intended, on the one hand, to 
assist in reconstructing the country after 30 years of a liberation war and, on the 
other, to transmit the fighters’ Maoist ideology to the younger generation. Shortly 
afterwards, from 1998 to 2000, another devastating war with Ethiopia took place. 
Two years later an international court of arbitration, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission (EEBC), granted parts of the disputed border area to Eritrea; Ethio-
pia has refused to this day to implement the verdict. In response, Eritrea spoke of 
a state of “cold peace” and in 2002 extended the national service to an indefinite 
term. Since then, men have been required to work from age 18 to at least age 50 
for companies belonging to the military or the party, earning only an allowance; 
the same requirement applies to women up to age 27. Depending on their qualifi-
cations, individuals are put to work performing manual tasks in construction and 
agriculture, in the administration, or as teachers and medical personnel. The gov-
ernment determines the location, meaning that families are often permanently torn 
apart. The prospect of a life of serfdom that doesn’t allow the labourers to feed their 
families has led to a mass exodus (Hirt und Mohammad 2013; Kibreab 2014). Ac-
cording to UNHCR figures, 5,000 primarily young people currently flee over the 
borders each month – despite orders to shoot – to Ethiopia or Sudan or across the 
Red Sea to the Arabian Peninsula.
Stopovers on the Refugees’ Escape Route
European interest in Eritrea and the causes of human flight from the country in-
creased significantly in 2014, when, according to the UNHCR, 37,000 Eritrean 
refugees managed to reach Europe – a massive increase over the 13,000 Eritreans 
seeking asylum in 2013. In 2015, approximately 40,000 Eritreans arrived via the 
Mediterranean, making the small country with a population of approximately four 
million the largest “producer of refugees” in Africa. What is often forgotten, though, 
is that the majority of those who flee remain in neighbouring Sudan and Ethiopia: 
130,000 and 125,000 UNHCR-registered Eritreans live in the two countries, re-
spectively, including a significant share of unaccompanied minors. The number of 
non-registered cases is much higher, particularly in Sudan. 
In Ethiopia most refugees live in precarious conditions in camps in the border 
provinces Tigray and Afar. They are provided with a rudimentary amount of food, 
but the camps offer absolutely no employment prospects. A minority of people who 
have relatives in the country provide for themselves, and some Eritreans even study 
at Ethiopian universities. The majority, however, wait (mostly unsuccessfully) to 
be accepted in an industrialised country through the UNHCR’s resettlement pro-
gramme, or they set off in the direction of Europe. 
In Sudan the living conditions in the camps are similarly lacking in prospects, 
which is why the majority of arrivals attempt to continue on to Khartoum, where 
Eritreans can find work relatively easy through the diaspora established there 
since the liberation war. With their savings, they pay smugglers who promise to 
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help them make their way through Libya, and more recently Egypt, to Europe. All 
around the refugee camps and in the Sudanese capital, a human-smuggling and 
human-trafficking industry, in which both Eritrean and Sudanese officials are in-
volved, is flourishing (Van Reisen, Estefanos, and Rijken 2014). Between 2009 and 
2012, 10,000 Eritrean refugees attempted to reach Israel over the Egyptian Sinai 
Peninsula, falling into the hands of unscrupulous Bedouins, who tortured them in 
order to blackmail relatives in the diaspora; in recent years, however, the escape 
route has shifted back to Libya, where human traffickers and smugglers also carry 
out their questionable deals (SAHAN/IGAD 2016).
Between Fear and Hope
The dangers of travelling to Europe are well known. Thousands of Eritreans, includ-
ing pregnant women and newborns, have died in recent years after their boats have 
capsized. In the last week of May 2016 alone, approximately 880 people drowned 
(UNHCR 2016), many of them from Eritrea. Nevertheless, many Eritreans dream of 
an onward journey to Europe. On the one hand, they are in touch with friends and 
relatives who have either lived there for years or have only recently arrived and who 
frequently talk up their situation, creating a pull effect. On the other hand, many 
of those stranded in Eritrea’s neighbour countries are not only afraid of the lacking 
prospects of life in the refugee camp but also justifiably fear being kidnapped in the 
camps by human traffickers and sold to criminal gangs – though the danger of fall-
ing into the hands of such groups, particularly in the failed state of Libya, also exists 
during flight (SAHAN/IGAD 2016). 
In Sudan, where the government maintains close relations with Eritrean dic-
tator Isaias Afewerki, many Eritreans live in perpetual fear of being picked up by 
agents of their government and deported to Eritrea (Treiber 2013). In the past it 
was primarily government opponents or former officials of the Eritrean regime who 
were impacted by such actions; more recently, however, actual raids have taken 
place. At the end of May 2016, Sudanese soldiers apprehended 900 Eritreans in 
Khartoum and 400 who were on their way to Libya. The smugglers’ attempts to 
bribe – as usual – the security forces involved did not succeed. The refugees were 
arrested and then, according to eyewitness reports, loaded into trucks with the help 
of the Eritrean embassy and deported to Eritrea, where they were brought to a pris-
on (IRIN 2016; Sudan Tribune 2016). Illegally crossing the border to escape the 
national service is considered treason in Eritrea. Those captured in the act are not 
provided with any legal process; rather, they are usually kept prisoner in detention 
camps for months, before being reassigned to the national service.
The question thus arises as to why the Sudanese government, which is oth-
erwise relatively lax when it comes to human smuggling, is suddenly taking such 
measures. Sudanese government employees – especially in the eastern provinces 
(Kassala and Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar), which cooperate closely with the Eritrean regime, 
and in Khartoum – are often involved in human trafficking themselves or profit 
indirectly from bribes. It is likely that the most recent anti-refugee raids are con-
nected to the proposed European aid for containing the flow of refugees. 
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The EU and the Khartoum Process: Complicity with Those  
Causing Refugees to Flee?
Given the increasing number of refugees from Eritrea and other African countries, 
the EU made the decision in fall 2014 to cooperate with autocratic or highly authori-
tarian regimes such as those in Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia as part of the Khar-
toum Process in order to limit illegal migration and human trafficking. The aim is 
to prevent refugees from embarking on the onward journey to Europe. Among other 
things, these countries’ border protection is to be improved and their institutions 
strengthened in order to prevent migration streams. With the vague promise of 
wanting to combat the wave of refugees from its own country, the Eritrean govern-
ment also managed to obtain a pledge of over EUR 200 million in development 
assistance from the EU, which is not conditional upon democratic reforms or the 
reform of the national service. According to reports from the Spiegel and Report 
Mainz, the EU Commission plans to deliver border monitoring equipment such as 
cameras and scanners to Sudan via the German Agency for International Develop-
ment Cooperation (GIZ) in order to aid in the registration of refugees and to train 
border personnel (Spiegel Online 2016). The apparent aim is to make it impos-
sible or more difficult for refugees from Eritrea, who have managed to cross their 
country’s borders despite orders to shoot, to make the onward journey via Sudan 
to Europe. What is noteworthy is that even the EU representatives involved were 
apparently not convinced of the value of such measures, since, according to the 
Spiegel, they wanted to prevent the outcome of their discussions from being made 
public at all costs.
Theoretically, the EU and the German government are in agreement that in 
order to limit migration to Europe, the focus should be on fighting the root causes 
of human flight. It is also clear within the EU that refugees’ flight from Eritrea is 
primarily caused by the indefinite national service; the denial of political, econom-
ic, and social rights; and the absence of private-sector employment opportunities 
(GSDRC 2016: 1). Against this backdrop, it seems strange that the Khartoum Pro-
cess is aiming to improve living conditions in the refugee camps only in a very limit-
ed manner and that new camps with prison cells are being planned instead (Spiegel 
Online 2016). What is also questionable is that Sudanese president Al-Bashir, who 
has been accused by the International Criminal Court of crimes against humanity, 
is being given funds to strengthen his security forces. At the same time, the EU is 
promising unconditional development aid to Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki, 
who is suspected of having committed similar crimes by a UN human rights com-
mission. Independent NGOs able to implement projects without being under state 
control are forbidden in Eritrea, and the allocation of funds by the government is 
completely non-transparent: in 25 years of independence not a single state budget 
has been published.
Europe as a Pawn of the Eritrean Regime
Europe’s Eritrea policy has long been characterised by inconsistency and a will-
ingness to allow the Eritrean regime to lead Europe around by the nose: In 1997 
the Eritrean government unilaterally ended its cooperation with bilateral European 
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funders, citing its self-reliant development strategy, only to call them back in 2001 
after the war with Ethiopia. In the same year, the country underwent a political 
crisis. The president had 11 high-ranking members of the ruling party arrested after 
they had called for political reforms and the curbing of his absolute power, and he 
rejected the implementation of the constitution, which had been ratified in 1997, 
and future democratisation processes.
The journalists of the free press also met the same fate: Like the reformers, they 
were held for years in solitary confinement without trial; most of them are consid-
ered to have died by now given the miserable conditions of their imprisonment. 
Following the wave of arrests, then Italian ambassador Bandini complained to 
President Isaias in the name of the EU and was promptly expelled from the country. 
The remaining EU representatives were initially recalled, but they soon returned to 
Asmara, without protesting further against the regime’s grievous human rights vio-
lations. In 2005, virtually all bilateral funders and international NGOs were again 
expelled from the country. Nevertheless, the EU unhesitatingly sought rapproche-
ment through dialogue as of 2007. Using this approach, the then EU development 
commissioner Louis Michel sought unsuccessfully to secure the release of the Swed-
ish-Eritrean journalist Dawit Issak. In 2009, the EU granted the Eritrean govern-
ment EUR 122 million in development assistance, of which 34 million went to road 
construction. Since 2006, all construction companies have been in the possession 
of the ruling party and have systematically used national service recruits as forced 
labour. The EU thus essentially gave the Eritrean regime carte blanche to carry out 
its forced militarisation policy.
In 2011, the Eritrean government decided to return the remaining EU funds 
and to terminate cooperation for the time being – probably because it was in this 
year that gold mining began in the country. Yet in 2014 Eritrea’s leadership again 
demonstrated openness to various European delegations, which travelled to the 
country and offered funding for training programmes, demanding that the govern-
ment curb the flow of migrants in return. In December 2015, as part of the 11th 
European Development Fund, the EU pledged EUR 200 million, which are to go to 
the energy sector and to support improved governance. Even the German minister 
for development and cooperation, Dr. Gerd Müller, travelled to President Isaias to 
discuss the resumption of cooperation (Deutsche Botschaft Asmara 2015).
No End to the Indefinite National Service in Sight
In 2015, presidential advisor Yemane Gebreab repeatedly promised foreign delega-
tions that the national service would be limited to 18 months for the most recent 
round of recruits. This promise has now been reversed in talks with a Swiss–Ger-
man mission, which responded with disappointment (Swissinfo.ch 2016). This dis-
appointment reflects the misjudgement of European policymakers regarding the 
actual extent of the national service. Following the end of the Eritrean–Ethiopian 
war, the World Bank funded a USD 200 million demobilisation and reintegration 
programme for the then approximately 250,000 soldiers of the Eritrean army, with 
the goal of making it possible for them to live a civilian life. This programme was 
halted abruptly one year later, and since then 20,000 young people have been re-
cruited annually. According to government reports, by 2015 a total of half a million 
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Eritreans had successfully completed the Sawa military camp, which functions both 
as a boarding school and as the starting point for the national service. Since 2002, 
only married women have been demobilised. Men typically undertake decades of 
service in the military or performing civil duties. The only alternative is to flee the 
country.
The number of people currently serving in the national service is likely at least 
300,000 – from a population of approximately four million. To reintegrate these 
people into the private sector through a demobilisation programme would require 
not only a carefully developed strategy but also readiness on the part of the gov-
ernment to liberalise the economy, to allow private initiatives, and to loosen its 
rigid control over all areas of public life. The regime justifies the forced militari-
sation of the entire society (Hirt and Mohammad 2013) with the ongoing threat 
posed by Ethiopia and the inability of the international community to move the 
neighbour country to implement the EEBC border decision. It is correct that the 
international pressure on Ethiopia is limited; the country is held in high regard as 
a haven of stability within the volatile Horn of Africa. However, the mass recruit-
ing of Eritreans to the army and to forced state service does not contribute in any 
way to their willingness to defend the country. For this purpose, a professional, 
well-trained, and paid career army would make far more sense. The chosen strategy 
can be interpreted much more as the country’s lapse back to the pre-state mode of 
the independence struggle. Rather than enjoying the fruits of independence, the 
people should, now as then, patriotically and without pay, sacrifice themselves for 
the nation; however, they are choosing to flee instead. In 2000, following the end 
of the Eritrean–Ethiopian war, it was decided in the Algiers Peace Agreement to 
transfer the decision regarding the delimitation of the border to an international 
commission. As one of the guarantors of the agreement, the EU has a duty to pres-
sure Ethiopia to implement the 2002 decision on the border, which is binding un-
der international law. In doing so, it would deprive the Eritrean government of the 
ideological justification for its policies. 
Also noteworthy is that Eritrea’s political leadership has been consciously toler-
ating the mass exodus for some time – in contradiction of its own rhetoric – because 
it contributes to domestic stability: On the one hand, it serves as an outlet for the 
frustrated youth, who seek their salvation in flight rather than resistance; on the 
other, the government requires Eritreans living overseas to pay a diaspora tax of 2 
per cent of their income, which together with other donations and charges makes 
up approximately one-third of the state budget (Hirt 2015: 125). At least equally 
important are private money transfers from Eritreans abroad to relatives still in the 
country who are prevented from earning a living due to the national service. The 
regime thus profits indirectly from the exodus of the population and has ingenious 
transnational structures at its disposal to keep the diaspora in check. It is not fac-
ing – we should be clear about this – imminent collapse and is thus also not willing 
to make reforms.
Possible Alternatives: What Can Europe Do?
The Khartoum Process and European politicians’ political courting of the Eritrean 
government will not lead to political reforms; rather, it will further strengthen the 
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political elite. Over the years, the regime has learned how to exploit the EU’s readi-
ness to engage in dialogue to its own material advantage, without ever having been 
prepared to make concessions in the areas of democracy or human rights. Europe’s 
current strategy of on the one hand unconditionally allocating Eritrea money from 
the 11th Development Fund, the use of which will not have any impact on the causes 
of human flight, and simultaneously investing money in the Sudanese security sec-
tor to register and, as a precaution, intern refugees whom Germany is currently 
recognising as being entitled to asylum without reservation can only be described 
as cynical.
What is required to combat the well-known causes of human migration is, in-
stead, clear demands from the EU and assistance that is tied to conditions:
 • The reform of the indefinite national service as part of a demobilisation pro-
gramme, which would require significant financial resources.
 • The liberalisation of the command economy, which is currently controlled by 
the governing party and the military.
 • Democratic reforms and the establishment of the rule-of-law. 
 • It is to be expected that the Eritrean president, despite sporadic lip service, will 
not be willing to undertake such reforms. For this reason, a consistent policy 
that makes financial support conditional upon a concrete reform programme is 
necessary.
 • The goal of the Khartoum Process and similar programmes should not be a re-
strictive course of action against refugees but rather the improvement of their 
living conditions on-site in the neighbouring countries.
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